The Great Depression: An Amateur's Analysis of Cause and Recovery

       Many history teachers teach the “oversimplified version” of the 1929 crash and the ensuing Great Depression. The story goes something like this: Margin-buying in the stock market led to a speculative boom which created instability. Rumors of industry slowdowns in construction and automobile manufacturing as well as rampant speculation led large investors to sell out causing a generalized panic in the market that was unable to be saved by big banks and investors. This crash led to a great depression. From this point, banks that had investments in the market as well as substantial mortgages and loans were unable to meet the rise in depositor panic forcing many to close their doors. Surviving banks then engaged in tight lending policies leading to a contraction in business and industry. Additionally, President Hoover’s administration further slowed the economy with the Smoot-Hawley Tariff grounding international trade to a halt. Finally, US farmers never enjoyed the prosperity of the 1920s and throughout that decade continued to face foreclosures, which increased during the Depression leading to further pressures on rural banks. Despite Roosevelt’s efforts through the New Deal, it was increased government spending in WWII that brought recovery. The End.

            Perhaps pieces of this overview need some correction. Especially after the 1987 Stock Market nose-dive, it has largely been accepted that the Stock Market crash did not inevitably lead to the Great Depression. Nonmonetary factors, tight-money monetary policies, along with poor fiscal policy decisions kept the economy in retraction; it was not until the United States dumped the gold standard and then saw an unanticipated increase in its gold reserves did the Great Depression finally end.

            In the late 1920s, speculation brought more investors into the stock market demanding money to buy which led to an increase in margin-buying. Some economic historians contend that the Federal Reserve engaged in tight money practices to discourage margin-buying to slow the speculative boom.[1] Rather than slowing the practice, margin-buying simply moved into the private investors, corporations, and foreign banks and the bubble grew. Prior to the inclusion of margin-buying, investors were typically more well-versed in their investments and made sophisticated choices; thereafter, the ability to purchase stocks with ease brought in a variety of new investors who were ignorant of their investments.[2]

            Stock overvaluation and over-speculation were apparent to more sophisticated investors. As one stated, “When the shoeshine boy was talking to me about his investments, I knew it was time to sell out.”[3] Additionally, due to declines in construction and automobiles, two of the biggest sectors in the American economy investors became jumpy leading to a selling craze and the market crash. As in 1987, this did not have to spell a Great Depression; however, the Federal Reserve’s continued strict monetary policies made it inevitable. Rather than taking a note from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and easing lending restrictions – which confined the crash to the stock market – the Federal Reserve maintained its tight policies which prevented economic recovery.[4]

            After the crash, with fear surrounding the solvency of banks and the expectation of exchange-rate devaluation, depositors showed up in droves to pull their deposits. According to Ben Bernanke, with an unregulated fractional reserve, the banks simply ran out of money and were forced to close their doors – which led to more panic and bank closures. Since bank loans and investments play a leading role in the money supply, investor panic created drains on the reserves.[5]

            Rather than engage in inflationary policies that would have led to an endogenous increase in the money supply (had to use the word), the Federal Reserve maintained its tight money policies throughout the 30s. The government’s adherence to the gold standard until 1933 retarded the growth of the money supply leading to higher interest rates and less economic growth.[6] As Christina Romer stated in her hypothesis of what ended the Depression, if countries, not just the United States, would have engaged in monetary expansion by dumping the gold standard, then it would have had substantial nonmonetary benefits in more investor optimism, as well as substantial monetary benefits in a reduction of interest rates.[7]

            Fiscal policy also contributed with the passage of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff in 1930. The tariff contributed to a further decline in the world economy. In fact, 1,028 economists begged Congress to reject the tariff as they predicted it would ground international trade to a halt.[8] They were right. As a June 9, 1931 from the Baltimore Sun decried, some of the US’s closest trading partners, including Canada, reacted negatively reducing the number of purchases by about 20 million dollars.[9] Additionally, 70 additional nations passed retaliatory tariffs. [10] While it is short-sighted to fully blame Smoot-Hawley for the Depression, its impact on the worldwide economy cannot be ignored.

            The end of the Depression did not come with Roosevelt’s New Deal relief programs. These programs were only sustainable in so far as the federal government sustained them. Relief programs did not bring true recovery.[11] Recovery may be attributed to dumping the gold standard in 1933 as well as an unexpected increase in the United States' gold reserves due to political instability in Europe.  According to Ben Bernanke, countries that left the gold standard experienced better recovery and, after 1934, the US began to experience some recovery. More compellingly, this recovery may be attributable to the increase in the US money supply due to the political instability in Europe. Roosevelt did not sterilize this influx, and this encouraged some economic recovery through lower interest rates which stimulated investments and continued through WWII.[12]

            The Great Depression provides continuous fodder for economists and economic historians to debate. It is doubtful that there will ever truly be consensus data that all will agree upon as to what caused and solved it. It is unlikely that it was totally one issue or another, but rather an interplay of several issues working together that sent the world’s economy into a tailspin and back into recovery.

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[1] Ben Bernanke, “The Macroeconomics of the Great Depression: A Comparative Approach,” Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 27, no. 1 (Feb. 1995), 6, https://www.jstor.org/stable/2077848.

[2] Eugene N. White, “The Stock Market Boom and Crash of 1929 Revisited,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 4, no. 2 (Spring 1990): 70.

[3] New York: A Documentary Film, episode 5, “Cosmopolis: 1914-1931,” Directed by Ric Burns, on PBS, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RJpLMvgUXe8.

[4] White, 81.

[5] Bernanke, 6-7

[6] Ibid., 5, 16.

[7] Christina Romer, “What Ended the Great Depression?” The Journal of Economic History 52, no. 4 (Dec. 1992): 776, https://www.jstor.org/stable/2123226.

[8] “The Smoot-Hawley Tariff: A Grisly Tale,” The Baltimore Sun, May 7, 1953: 22. ProQuest Historical Newspapers.

[9] “U.S. Sales Abroad Show April Slump,” The Baltimore Sun, June 9, 1931, ProQuest Historical Newspapers.

[10] “The Smoot-Hawley Tariff: A Grisly Tale.”

[11] For a fuller understanding of the impacts and uneven distribution in relief programs, see Price Fishback’s “The Newest on the New Deal,” Essays in Economic & Business History 36, (2018).

[12] Romer, 781-782.

James B. Duke: Cigarettes and Power

    Despite his dominance of two major industries in the South, very few people have probably heard of the name James Buchanan Duke. It is unclear why the man for whom Duke University is named and who monopolized the tobacco industry and then took that wealth to invest in hydroelectric power soon dominating that industry throughout the South does not even merit a footnote in the history books. However, his importance to the southern tobacco industry and electric infrastructure is indisputable.

James B. Duke
Wikipedia

     James Duke’s keen businesses sense took his father, Wash Duke’s, tobacco firm and turned it into the American Tobacco Company (ATC) making him one of the wealthiest men in the United States. His success in tobacco came first through acquiring and improving two of James A. Bonsack’s rolling machines and second through a mass advertising campaign. His acquisition of the Bonsack rolling machine allowed him to mass produce quality rolled cigarettes, reduce labor costs, meet the increasing demands, and eliminate his competition.[1] Additionally, to maintain the demand for Duke brand cigarettes, James Duke spent around 20% of his sales on in-house advertising.[2] Trading card sets used sex appeal, adventure, and manliness, advertisements were included in trade magazines, and eventually billboards and wall paintings were employed to sell ATC products. Success led him to develop a trust with five other tobacco companies and, after failing to destroy it, into a partnership with England’s Imperial Tobacco Company. ATC dominated between 71%-96.1% of the tobacco market and was one of the most powerful companies in the United States by 1907.[3]

Isabella Terrise from the Actors and Actresses Series

Card Number 319

Duke Sons & Co., www.metmuseum.org

    Unfortunately, for Southern tobacco growers, the creation of this trust was disastrous. There was little incentive for ATC companies to pay high dollar for the grower’s tobacco leaving them indebted and bankrupt.[4] North Carolina law also placed an excise tax and a fee of $5000 on any company or individual selling direct to consumer. The tobacco growers had little choice but to sell their crop for what the ATC trust offered. This led to the Tobacco Wars between 1904-1909, which included two different disputes – The Black Patch Tobacco Wars and the Burley Tobacco Strike. Farmers throughout Kentucky and Tennessee attempted to band together to withhold their black tobacco and burley tobacco from sale until ATC paid 18-20 cents a pound. The fight against the ATC led to a fight among the growers themselves. For farmers who continued to sell to ATC, “Night Riders” destroyed tobacco crops, threatened, and committed violence. While the Black Patch efforts were an abject failure, the Burley strike resulted in short term success as the ATC’s burley crop dwindled to dangerously low levels forcing them to give into the striker’s demands for two years.[5]

H.A. Vivian, "How Crime is Breeding Crime in Kentucky," New York Times, 1908.
The Tobacco War

    In 1911, the Supreme Court ruled that ATC violated the Sherman Anti-Trust Act constituting a “restraint of trade…and an attempt to monopolize…”[6] and Duke was forced to break it up. Duke expressed his incredulity at the ruling by challenging the government’s definition – or lack thereof -- of a trust. He held that they broke up his business because it was big, not because it engaged in unethical business practices designed to bury his competition and rule the southern tobacco farmer. As with Rockefeller, Duke saw his monopoly as a stabilizing influence keeping prices low, employing thousands of people, and building the southern economy.[7]

"To End the Tobacco Trust," The Baltimore Sun, Oct. 15, 1911

    Despite the break-up of his tobacco conglomerate, James Duke was a wealthy man, and a new enterprise caught his attention: hydroelectric power. Introduced to the possibilities of by Dr. W. Gill Wylie, Duke believed electricity was the wave of the future. In 1905, James and his brother, Ben, incorporated the Southern Power Company (SPC) in New Jersey and then acquired Wylie’s Catawba Power Company’s outstanding stock, land, and water rights eventually taking over several other corporations. The Duke brothers had “first-mover” advantages, and by 1920, over 94 percent of all electricity flowed through transmission lines produced by hydroelectric plants under Duke’s control.[8] Even though North Carolina claimed a “regulatory board” to oversee the actions of this utility, it is more aptly considered a “supervisory board” and the North Carolina government was content with SPC’s actions even providing the company with eminent domain power.[9] North Carolina was pulled into the modern era.

    Eventually, Duke met his match in the Public Service Company located in Salisbury, NC. When he attempted to raise their rates, they balked and refused to pay. Duke threatened to shut off all power to the city causing an economic collapse. The company sued and the case was heard in Guildford County by Duke’s longtime nemesis, Justice Walter Clark. Clark ruled that the public nature of Duke’s company and the powers given to it by the state “subjected it to public control” and required that rate changes be uniform and “fair and reasonable.” It did not, however, break Duke’s market dominance. Duke appealed, lost, and then begrudgingly accepted the changes using the regulations to his advantage as most understood North Carolina depended on Duke money to maintain its power infrastructure. In 2012, Duke Energy merged with Progress Energy and is now the largest regulated utility company in the United States.

    As with all the major industrialists in the late 19^th-early 20^th centuries, Duke’s legacy is mixed. He used his vast wealth to fund Duke University, build schools and hospitals, and invest in the South’s infrastructure. Conversely, his American Tobacco Company played a role in impoverishing southern tobacco growers. He brought modern electricity to the South but controlled its access. Perhaps, as one newspaperman wrote, the Catawba River had always been there and it was Duke who harnessed it with his money and risk, why should he not reap the rewards?

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[1] Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., “Scale, Scope, and Organizational Capabilities,” in Scale and Scope: The Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism (Harvard University Press, 1990), 26, ProQuest Ebook Central.

[2] Patrick G. Porter, “Advertising in the Early Cigarette Industry: W. Duke, Sons & Company of Durham,” The North Carolina Historical Review 48, no. 1 (1971): 31-43, https://www.jstor.org/stable/23518222; For further discussion on the importance of specialized marketing in large firms, see Chandler’s “Scale, Scope, and Organizational Capabilities” in Scale and Scope.

[3] Tracy Campbell, The Politics of Despair (University of Press of Kentucky: 1993), 24, https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt130jq0q; The percentage of the market controlled was based on tobacco type. 79.7% of plug and twist products, 71.2% of all smoking tobaccos, and 96.1% of all snuff products.

[4] Tracy Campbell’s Politics of Despair discusses this issue in depth; For a more personal story regarding the impact of Duke’s monopoly on individual tobacco growers see Wendell Berry’s “It All Turned on Affection,” The Progressive 76, no. 8 (2012): 16-21, ProQuest.

[5] For further study, Tracy Campbell’s Politics of Despair provides an in-depth study of both the Black Patch Tobacco War and the Burley Strike not only discussing ATC’s complicity, but what led to the organization of the growers and why they ultimately failed to succeed.

[6] United States v. American Tobacco Company, 221 U.S. 2016 (1911), in Justia US Supreme Court Center, https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/221/106/

[7] James B. Duke, “Politics and Prosperity,” The North American Review 201, no. 713 (1915): 521-529, https://www.jstor.org/stable/25108425.

[8] Chandler, “Scale and Scope,” 34-35; John James Kaiser, “Clark v. Duke: The Struggle for Water Rights and the Future of North Carolina’s Public Energy Policy,” Southern Cultures Electric 20, no. 3 (2014): 126, 130, doi:10.1353/scu.2014.0027.

[9] For further information on difference between supervisory and regulatory commissions, see Robert Bradley and Roger Donway’s “Reconsidering Gabriel Kolko: A Half-Century Perspective,” The Independent Review 17, no. 4 (2013): 561-76.

Bibliography

Berry, Wendell. "It All Turns on Affection." The Progressive (Madison) 76, no. 8 (2012): 16-21.

Bradley, Robert and Roger Donway. "Reconsidering Gabriel Kolko: A Half-Century Perspective." The Independent Review 17, no. 4 (2013): 561-76. ProQuest.

Campbell, Tracy. The Politics of Despair. University of Kentucky Press, 1993.

Chandler, Alfred D. "Scale, Scope, and Organizational Capabilities." In Scale and Scope: The Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism, 14-46. Harvard University Press, 1990.

Duke, James B. "Politics and Prosperity." The North American Review 201, no. 713 (1915): 521-529. https://www.jstor.org/stable/25108425.

Kaiser, John James. "Clark v. Duke: The Struggle for Water Rights and the Future of North Carolina's Public Energy Policy," Southern Cultures 20, no. 3 (Fall 2014): 123-136. doi: 10.1353/scu.2014.0027.

Porter, Patrick G. “Advertising in the Early Cigarette Industry: W. Duke, Sons & Company of Durham.” The North Carolina Historical Review 48, no. 1 (1971): 31-43, https://www.jstor.org/stable/23518222

"To End Tobacco Trust: Method of Dissolving the Company Made Public. Four Corporations Planned." The Baltimore Sun, Oct. 15, 1911, ProQuest Historical Newspapers.

Vivian, H.A. "How Crime is Breeding Crime in Kansas." New York Times, July 26, 1908. ProQuest Historical Newspapers.

The American Woman: Postbellum 19th Century Entrepreneurs

In 1880, the population of the United States was 50,155,783 with a nearly equal male-to-female ratio. By 1880, women made up approximately 15.2% of the labor force and could generally be found in mills, factories, professional services, and domestic and personal services. However, once one begins to look at female entrepreneurship, the statistics become a little less clear. Rather than use the term businesswoman, which can sometimes mean office worker or somebody who works in a business, the term entrepreneur is used to more clearly define the female business owner of the 1870s and 1880s (Roberts 2020, Lecture). There were thousands of female entrepreneurs in Postbellum America and the study of their business ventures is an important aspect of American entrepreneurial history. However, the study of female entrepreneurship is the study of very small businesses as Gamber says – microhistory (Gamber 1998, 190, 193). What types of businesses did women open in the 1870s and 1880s and how do they differ from region to region? This comparison analyzes the directories of Dayton and Hamilton – two decent-sized Midwestern cities and compared them to three cities in postbellum Virginia – Lynchburg, Norfolk, and Richmond. While women tended to open businesses in the same occupation regardless of location with some notable exceptions, the volume of these businesses demonstrated some statistically significant differences.

This was a labor of frustration and interest leading to more questions and, perhaps one day, more research. Robyn Mundy’s Master’s Thesis “A Profile of Virginia Businesswomen During the Civil War Era”, Ilene Goldenberg’s Honor’s Thesis “The Businesswomen of Richmond During the Civil War Era,” provided most of the legwork on women’s entrepreneurship in Virginia’s cities. Ohio’s data took a little more digging through using US Census data for 1870 and 1880 as well as “Williams’ Hamilton City Directory” for 1875-76 and 1883-1884 and “Neder’s Dayton City Directory” for 1876 and “Proudfoot & Urquhart’s Dayton City Directory” for 1881-1882.

Certain occupations considered “feminine” work were dominated by female entrepreneurs in all five cities. Historians have long believed that these were logical business ventures for women as they were extensions of their domestic capabilities. Although Gamber argues that while this may have accounted for some decisions, dressmaking was a skilled labor that most women learned through apprenticeship and the level of craftsmanship exceeded typical at-home needlework. Regardless, dressmaking and millinery were often deemed women’s spheres and female entrepreneurs were able to open their shops while maintaining social and cultural norms (Gamber 1998, 204-206). 

Women made up nearly 100% of dressmakers across the board and anywhere from 44-80% of milliners and fancy goods. While the number of millinery businesses in operation was consistent based on population size, the number of dressmaking businesses demonstrates a clear difference between Ohio and Virginia. As the largest city in this overview, Richmond women only ran 41 dressmaking shops as compared to Dayton’s approximately 245. There were only 13 and 12 female dressmakers in Norfolk and Lynchburg, respectively compared to Hamilton’s 57 (See Table 2). 

There are several possible explanations for this difference. Having a dress custom-made was expensive and Richmond, Norfolk, and Lynchburg were all directly impacted by the Civil War and its outcome and likely lacked the wealthy population to support many dressmaking businesses (Barber 1997, 304-306). Not only did these cities have to focus on rebuilding, but the South also resisted Henry Grady’s vision of a “New South” with a complementarian system of agriculture and industry. Many Southerners, as later perpetuated by the United Daughters of the Confederacy, held onto the Lost Cause and agriculture and agricultural industry – mainly tobacco and its derivatives -- remained Virginia’s mainstay. This hampered the growth of wealth as well. However, as can be seen, the number of dressmakers did increase in Richmond within the decade indicating that some levels of wealth were returning to the city allowing for growth in this female-dominated market. 

In contrast, Ohio’s economy was not as negatively impacted by the Civil War and there was little need to rebuild in the areas of Dayton and Hamilton (near Cincinnati). Unlike Virginia, Ohio did not resist industrialization and both Dayton and Hamilton experienced the wealth that came from the Second Industrial Revolution. The exponential growth of the dressmaking industry indicates that there was an increase in demand for these expensive services. 

 Two additional notable differences between the cities were the number of boarding houses and female-owned boarding houses as well as saloons and female-owned saloons. While the Ohio cities have fewer boarding houses with a smaller percentage of female ownership, the number of saloons and female ownership is impressive, to say the least. Why do these statistical differences exist? 

Again, boarding house ownership is often considered an extension of the female domestic sphere; however, as with dressmaking and millinery, Gambler demonstrates that many women saw this field as an avenue of entrepreneurship as some purchased homes exclusively for rental – the original VRBO. What accounts for the difference in boarding house business? It is possible that Dayton and Hamilton lacked the transient populations of Lynchburg, Richmond, and Norfolk as they boasted more industry and thus a more settled population. Additionally, there is some evidence to suggest that “Boardinghouse” was synonymous with “brothel” an occupation for many poor women (Holmes 1989, 24). 

 As to the number of saloons, one explanation may have to do with the number of immigrants who took up residence in Ohio, especially German and Irish. While immigration picked up slightly in the South after the Civil War, immigration into the North and Midwest boomed due to the rise of new industries. In 1880, immigrants comprised roughly 12% of Ohio’s population as opposed to .97% of Virginia’s (see Table 3). Many of these immigrants were of German descent and brought with them the keys to brewing German lager which added to the long-present British ales. Cincinnati, a city within easy distance of Hamilton and Dayton, was often referred to as Zincinnati due to its large German population. Thus, Ohio boasted hundreds of breweries and since saloons in the 19th century served more beer than hard liquor, Ohioans’ penchant for beer provided a ready clientele for breweries and saloons (Fahey 2009, 106-108).

Saloon ownership was certainly outside the female sphere, so explaining female entrepreneurship in this industry will necessitate more research. Hamilton’s exponentially higher female ownership may relate more closely to its proximity to Cincinnati, and it would be unsurprising if the census data of the owners demonstrated German-immigrant origins. One might assume that most of the female saloon owners were owners through marriage, but a cursory glance at Dayton’s 1881 city directory showed that only six of the owners were married, the rest were single. Further research might also indicate why female ownership of saloons was much smaller in the three Virginia cities – likely an entire dissertation could be written on the subject. 

The interest in postbellum female entrepreneurship gained traction in the late 1990s but there is no recent scholarship available. It is a labor-intensive field with incomplete records. City directories are helpful but often use only initials making it difficult to track down the gender of the business owners. Researching this field requires a great deal of tedious work looking through and counting city directories, census data and census manuscripts, credit ledgers, newspapers, and advertisements. However, to better understand the history of American entrepreneurship, the history of female entrepreneurship throughout the US and its contributions to society, economics, and politics must be studied and compared.

Bibliography

Barber, Edna. “”Sisters of the Capital”: White Women in Richmond, Virginia, 1860-1880.” Dissertation, University of Maryland at College Park, 1997.

 Bennet, Thornton. “Williams’ Hamilton City Directory (1875-1876).” Williams & Co. Cincinnati & Hamilton County Pubic Library. https://digital.cincinnatilibrary.org/digital/collection/p16998coll5/id/213944.

 Fahey, David M. “Old-Time Breweries: Academic and Breweriana Historians.” Ohio History 116, (2009): 101-121. Project Muse.

 Gamber, Wendy. “A Gendered Enterprise: Placing Nineteenth-Century Businesswomen in History.” The Business History Review 72, no. 2 (Summer 1998): 188-217. Jstor.

 Goldenberg, Ilene. “The Businesswomen of Richmond During the Civil War Era.” Honors Thesis, University of Richmond, 1995.

 Hooks, Janet M. United States Department of Labor Women’s Bureau. “Women’s Occupations Through Seven Decades.” 1947. https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/files/docs/publications/women/b0218_dolwb_1947.pdf.

Holmes, Elizabeth Ann. “Women, Work, and the Civil War; The Effect of the Civil War on Women Working in Richmond, Virginia, Between 1860 and 1870.” Master’s Thesis, The College of William and Mary, 1989.

 Mundy, Robyn. “A Profile of Virginia Businesswomen During the Civil War Era.” Master’s Thesis, University of Richmond, 1999.

 Neder, George and William Winchell. “Neder’s Dayton City Directory for 1876.” Directory. Dayton, Ohio. Cincinnati and Hamilton County Public Library. https://digital.cincinnatilibrary.org/digital/collection/p16998coll5/id/64148.

Roberts, Carey. "Strategies for Comparative History." Video Lecture, Liberty University, 2020.

 U.S. Census Bureau; Twelfth Census of the United States Census Bulletin, 1901, Table 1; generated by William C. Hunt; using data.census.gov; https://www2.census.gov/library/publications/decennial/1900/bulletins/demographic/51-population-va.pdf.

 —. Census Bulletin: Population of Virginia by Minor Civil Divisions, 1891; Summary by Counties and Population by Minor Civil Divisions; data.census.gov; https://www2.census.gov/library/publications/decennial/1890/bulletins/demographics/83-population-of-va.pdf.

 —. Population of the United States and Territory, 1880; Table 1; census.data.gov; https://www2.census.gov/library/publications/decennial/1880/vol-01-population/1880_v1-07.pdf.

 —. Population of Civil Divisions Less than Counties, 1880; Table III Ohio; census.data.gov; https://www2.census.gov/library/publications/decennial/1880/vol-01-population/1880_v1-11.pdf.

 —. Statistics of the Place of Birth of the Population of the United States, 1880; Table XIV Ohio and Virginia; census.data.gov; https://www2.census.gov/library/publications/decennial/1880/vol-1-population/1880_v1-14.pdf.

 “United States City and Business Directories, ca. 1749-ca. 1990,” database, FamilySearch. https://familysearch.org/ark:/61903/3:1:eQHV-V3DF-GBCR?cc=3754697.

 Williams Directory Company. “Williams’ Hamilton City Directory [1883-1884]. Directory. Cincinnati and Hamilton County Public Library. https://digital.cincinnatilibrary.org/digital/collection/p16998coll5/id/217611.